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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Coal, America's most abundant fossil fuel, helped the country 
shift to an industrialized nation in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. It remained the country's principal fuel until 
World War II, then peaked at its end. Coal production has since 
been on a long decline; it simply could not compete with cheap and 
convenient oil and natural gas. However, the Arab oil embargo in 
the early 1970's and the realization of America's growing dependence 
on foreign oil rekindled interest in coal. 
Estimates of America's recoverable reserves are as high as 438 
billion tons - nearly one-third of the world's known supplies. The 
United States has enough coal, if one looks only at the physical 
resource itself, for any reasonably expected level of production, 
for at least the next hundred years.(41) Yet coal now provides only 
18 percent of the energy consumed in the U.S.(39), or the equivalent 
of 7000 barrels per day, used almost exclusively to generate 
electricity, as reflected in Figure 1. As a result, even though 
production levels have been improving along with the rise in oil 
prices, demand for switching to coal-burning facilities has yet to 
pick up. 
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FIGURE 1 
U.S . CONSUMPTION OF BITUMINOUS COAL AND LIGNITE 
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Source: Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress, Volume III, 1977 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1978), p. 78. 
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In April, 1977, President Carter proposed his National Energy 
Plan giving coal a key role. Calling for an 80 percent increase in 
coal production by 1985, he proposed an expanded program of research 
and development and pushed for the conversion from scarcer fuels to 
coal. The plan outlined a coal conversion program which, in 
modified form, became the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act of 
1978. It proposed the levying of a tax to raise the cost of oil and 
natural gas to utility and industrial users, while at the same time 
providing an investment tax credit for coal conversion programs. 
New power plants and major fuel burning installations were to be 
barred from burning oil or natural gas as a boiler fuel, but could 
acquire temporary or permanent exemptions. A general exemption 
could be granted due to lack of alternative fuel supplies, site 
limitations, environmental requirements, or inadequate capital. 
Existing plants with the capacity to burn coal also were to be 
prohibited from burning oil or natural gas.(41) 
In May, 1979, the Carter Administration submitted a second 
National Energy Plan to Congress. The Department of Interior was 
directed to accelerate coal leasing on federal lands in the West. 
Increased funding for low-cost efficient mining technology was 
promi sed, as well as support for coal slurry pipeline legislation. 
This second plan also recommended intervention by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) to promote marginal cost pricing for coal 
transportation . 
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Another- important legislative development was the enactment of 
the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Refom Act of 1976. Its 
pr-imary purpose was to r-estore the nation • s debt-ridden railroad 
industry to financial health and to reduce the burden of economic 
regulation. Its major pr-ovisions (1) restrict regulatory 
jurisdiction to market dominant situations to foster competition and 
·place maximum reliance on the marketplace; (2) direct the ICC to 
make a continuing effort to assist rail carriers in achieving 
adequate revenues; and (3) call for the enactment of new procedures 
and concepts for railroad costing and pricing.(l6) 
Despite these legislative efforts to develop coal as a 
dominant alternative resource, the results have been disappointing. 
Coal has been henuned in by political issues arising over what the 
public views as the side effects of producing as well as using this 
product. The coal industry sued the Carter administration, claiming 
the rules were too strict. However, the 1980 election ejected these 
environmentalists from policy-making positions. Then, the industr-y 
began suing the Reagan administration for making the regulations too 
lax. Recently, an amendment to an Interior Department funding bill 
has been proposed which would ban federal coal leasing pemanently. 
(This bill was in direct response to a report by the General 
Accounting Office that a 1982 lease sale in the Powder River Basin 
may have returned $100 million less to the federal tJ:"easury than 
dictated by fair market value.) (29) Yet, before the United States 
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can benefit from a further increased coal supply, another important 
issue is at stake: The country will need to more fully develop an 
efficient, economical, and environmentally acceptable system for 
moving coal. 
It is the belief of the writer that the coal industry is faced 
with a "Catch 22" situation whereby it has failed to promote its 
product. The United Mine Workers of America (UMW) has also failed 
to carry substantial political weight due to its own internal 
conflicts. Consequently, the industry lacks the political support 
it needs to improve the transportation systems . Improving these 
systems will ultimately make coal more economically attractive. 
This paper will examine the industry and transportation 
systems available to it. Concluding with recommendations to improve 
the marketability of coal, it is the belief that the enactment of 
these recommendations will effectively demand the attention of 
Congress to enact the necessary legislation. 
Literature. The literature on coal mining and its subsequent 
transportation was considered according to the following types: 
1. Descriptive writings--acticles in trade publications and 
public texts based on past experiences and knowledge 
2. Case studies--publications by trade organizations based on 
studies of selected cases and circumstances 
3. Government reports--legislative bills, committee hearing 
summaries, and reports 
4. Field research--includes comparative case studies and 
interviews 
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As a part of this study, requests were sent to 30 companies 
asking for infor-mation concerning their respective marketi ng plans. 
The majority replied by stating current plans were either delayed or 
disbanded. 
CHAPTER II 
UNTAPPED POTENTIAL 
To lessen our dependence on imported oil, 
they say, requires a balanced program of adopting 
reasonable conservation measures an 
investigation of the potentials of each energy 
source, an analysis based on the real world of 
political and institutional constraints in 
contemporary America, not·on the disembodied world 
of econometric models and · technological 
forecasts.(42) 
Table 1 shows estimates of the availability for 1990 of oil 
(foreign and domestic), gas, coal, nuclear power, and renewable 
sources (hydro and solar, for example). For energy supplies other 
than oil, the largest increase could come from new coal production, 
mainly in the United States. 
An 18-month intensive study by researchers from 16 countries 
was conducted and the results were released in May, 1980. The 
sununary of the World Coal Study (WOCOL) stated that OPEC's policy 
makes it all but inevitable that energy-consuming countries will 
have to make do with less oil--and at a rising price for the next 
two decades. Wind, water, and solar power will not grow fast enough 
to take up much of the slack. Nuclear energy, beset by a series of 
delays and setbacks, may prove to be politically unacceptable. What 
is left is coal. 
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TABLE 1 
INCREMENTAL ENERGY AVAILABILITY IN THE NONCOMMUNIST WORLD IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS OF OIL OR OIL EQUIVALENT PER DAY 
OPEC Oil 
Crude and 
Natural Gas 
Liquids 
38 
36 
34 
30 D 28
26 0 
1978 '90 '90 
low high 
Non-OPEC Oil 
Crude and 
Natural Gas 
Liquids 
30 
28 
26 
22 ~ ~~ D d 
1978 '90 '90 
low high 
m Saudia At'abia ~ Mexico 
p.t~,.,..l It"aq [.:/:;~;J Not:'th Sea 
Low: High: 
Gas 
28 
26 
24 
22 
20 
18 
16 D ~ 
1978 '90 '90 
low high 
~OPEC 
eli:a Mexico 
Sluggish Response Vigorous Response 
Coal 
28 
26 
24 
22 
20 
18 
16 0 
1978 '90 '90 
low high 
Nucleat" Power 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
I 
I 
zo ~ 
1978 '90 '90 
low high 
Hydro Powet" 
and Othet"s 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 0 ~ 
1978 '90 '90 
low high 
~ United States -United States ~ Less Devel-
oped Count-
t:'ies fi:?;:~ South Afr-ica f.=·r~~:j OECD Europe 
IEitJ Austrailia R Japan j:~ .:~·d OECD 
Sout'ce: Andre Benard, "Wot:'ld Oil and Cold Reality," Harvard Business Review, p. 92. 
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The United States does have an abundance of coal; however, 
coal is not without an abundance of problems. The three major types 
of bat"riers to the utilization of coal--which at"e environmental, 
human, and systematic--stand in the way of heavy reliance on coal as 
an alteLnative to imported oil. 
Envit"onmental. The main conceLn is the potential hazard of 
bun1ing coal whereby emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. 
In 1977 the National Academy of Sciences warned in a repot"t that a 
warming of the earth • s temperature due to the "greenhouse effect" 
from increased carbon dioxide emissions might pose a severe, 
long-term global threat. The Academy added, "The climatic effects 
of carbon dioxide release may be the primary limiting factor on 
energy production from fossil fuels over the next few 
centuries.'' (32) However, WOCOL director Carroll Wilson stressed 
that the most dire predictions about carbon dioxide effects are 
based on a projected growth rate of 4. 2 percent a year in energy 
use. WOCOL predicts that consumptions will increase at less than 
half that rate for the rest of the century, largely because of 
conservation.(40) 
Other problems in question are (1) the possibly serious public 
health consequences of long-term exposure to low levels of air 
pollutants, and (2) the risk of further damage to aquatic and 
terrestrial systems caused by "acid rain" resulting from increased 
coal combustion. These include emissions of sulfur dioxide, 
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nitrogen oxide, trace elements (including arsenic, cadmium, mercury, 
lead, flourine, and beryllium); thermal and chemical discharges into 
water; and the solid-waste disposal problems of coal ash . (9) 
Human. Certain hazards are inherent in coal mining because of 
the presence of such explosive and deadly gases as methane and 
carbon dioxide and because of the possibility of cave-ins and falls 
of rock. In December 1969, the passage of the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act marked the most significant federal 
legislation addressing health and safety in the coal industry. Its 
requirements included the establishment of "maximum allowable levels 
of respirable coal dust and methane gas, and safety standards for 
roof control, ventilation, electrical equipment, blasting and 
explosives, and general operating procedures."(l6) The statute also 
increased coal production costs and critics have pointed to its 
passage as the major cause, since 1969, of the steady reduction of 
the coal industry's productivity. See Table 2. In the 
labor-intensive coal business, productivity can mean the difference 
between profit and loss. 
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment reported 
estimates that a tripling of coal production by the end of the 
century would result annually in nearly 400 fatalities and 42,000 
disabling injuries among coal workers (almost three times the 
current rates), not counting the "thousands of workers" who would be 
disabled by various respiratory diseases (known collectively as 
black-lung disease) . (9) 
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TABLE 2 (16) 
ACCIDENT AND PRODUCTIVITY EXPERIENCE FOR U.S. COAL MINES, 1967-1977 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Fatality1 
Rate 
0.53 
0.80 
0 ."4 7 
0.65 
0.54 
0.44 
0.37 
0.37 
0.40 
0.39 
0.39 
Injury1 
Rate 
24.02 
23.13 
24.04 
28 . 07 
35.09 
36.06 
32.20 
25.34 
31.18 
40.53 
45.54 
Productivity2 Employees 
UNDERGROUND 
15.07 103.993 
15.40 98.831 
15.61 97.395 
13.76 102.379 
12.03 97,740 
11.91 109,396 
11.66 100,843 
11.31 113,169 
9.54 137,060 
8.50 137,316 
8.583 141,411 
Est. Prod.4 
Per Day 
1,567,175 
1,521,997 
1,520,336 
1,408,735 
1,175,812 
1,302,906 
1,175,829 
1,279,941 
1,307,552 
1,167,186 
1,213,306 
Fatality4 
Per Prod. 
Day 
0.83 
1. 22 
0. 71 
0.92 
0.63 
0.57 
0.44 
0.47 
0.52 
0.46 
0.47 
Percentage Change 
196 7-77 -0.26'1:. +90% -431. +361. -231. -43% 
SURFACE 
1967 0.12 4.99 35.17 24,064 846,331 0.10 
1968 0.13 5.49 34.24 24,400 835,456 0.11 
1969 0.14 4.79 35.71 25,323 904,284 0.13 
1970 0.12 5.42 36.26 31,103 1,127,795 0.14 
1971 0.09 5.91 35.88 33,344 1,196,383 0.11 
1972 0.08 5.53 36.33 35,364 1, 284' 774 0.10 
1973 0.06 4.63 36.67 30,475 1,117,518 0.07 
1974 0.08 4.20 33.16 44,491 1,475,322 0.12 
1975 0.10 5.28 26.69 57,562 1,536,330 0.15 
1976 0.06 5.78 25.50 55,993 1,427,822 0.09 
1977 0.07 5.53 27.34 65,254 1,784,044 0.12 
Percentage Change 
196 7-77 -0.42% +10% -22% +171'7'. +111% +20% 
1 Expressed in fatalities and disabling injuries per million tons. 
2 Expressed in tones mined per worker per shift. 
3 Preliminary estimate. 
4 Productivity multiplied by number of employees 
5 Fatality rate mutiplied by production per day divided by 106. 
6 Injury rate multiplied by production per day divided by 106. 
Injury 
Per Prod. 
Day 
37.64 
35.20 
36.55 
39.54 
41. 26 
46. 98 
3 7 . 86 
3 2 . 43 
40 .77 
4 7 .31 
55.25 
+471,. 
4.22 
4.59 
4.33 
6.11 
7.07 
7 . 10 
5 . 17 
6 . 20 
8.11 
8.25 
9 . 87 
+134% 
12 
U.S. COAL FIELDS 
Figure 2 
Principal Reserve Avg. 'To Avg. BTU 
Area Coal Type Tonnage* Sulfur Content 
N. Great Plains Subbituminous 182,400 1. O'To 9400 BTU/lb 
Rocky Mountain Bituminous 33,000 0.7 11600 
Central Bituminous 104,100 3 . 5 10300 
Gulf Coast Lignite 26,400 1.8 6500 
Appalachia Bituminous 113,000 1.8 13000 
*Millions of short tons 
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Systematic. The distribution of U.S. coal reserves is shown 
in Figure 2. This geographic distribution definitely affects the 
transportation network that links the production and consumption of 
coal. In 1975 about 65 per"cent was shipped rail, 11 percent by 
water, 12 percent by tLUck, 11 percent used at mine-mouth generating 
plants, and 1 percent by other methods. Transportation is one of 
the most important and most over-looked elements of cost in coal 
economics. Many times the tr-anspor-tation and handling costs of coal 
exceed the cost of mining and may account for" 80 to 90 per"cent of 
the deliver"ed cost.(2) 
Coal mined in the U.S. is usually categor-ized as either-
Easter-n or- Wester-n. About 54 per-cent of coal by weight (but only 30 
per-cent by heat content) is estimated to lie west of the 
Mississippi.(41) Western coals are generally less polluting 
although they also pr-ovide less energy per- pound. Coal is r"anked 
accor-ding to its carbon content with anthr-acite, bituminous, 
subbi tuminous, and lignite the highest to lowest ranking or-ders. 
Other important characteristics include moisture, sulfur and ash 
contents, and volatility. Typical properties of these four- grades 
are shown in table 3. 
TABLE 3: TYPICAL PROPERTIES OF COAL 
Heating Value Per-cent Ash % % 
Coal TYEe BTU Eer Pound Moistur-e Content Volatiles Sulfur 
Anthracite 12600 - 14400 3 Low 2 8 Below 1% 
Bituminous 11700 - 13500 3 - 15 Low 25 40 0 . 5'1o to 4't · 
Subbituminous 6300 - 11700 15 25 Moderate 33 50 0.5% 
Lignite 3600 - 7200 20 50 High 25 55 0.4% 
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Much of the Eastern coal is extracted by underground mining, 
the method used when coal is found at depths of 150 feet or more 
below the surface. The two techniques for mining underground are 
"room and pillar" and "longwall." The room and pillar technique is 
by far the more prevalent, currently accounting for 80 percent of 
underground mining output. This technique consists of cutting 
panels ("rooms") into the coal seam. As the coal is extracted, pil-
lars of coal are left in place to hold up the roof. Long pins call-
ed roof bolts must also be· drilled into the roof to keep it from 
collapsing--a time--consuming process. Initially, as much as hal f 
of the coal remains underground. Later, some of the pillars are 
removed, increasing the recovery rate. 
The longwall technique uses hydraulic-powered supports to prop 
up the roof of the mine while large mechanically driven shearers cut 
away at the coal. Since there are no pillars, this technique 
extracts a greater amount of coal than the room and pillar tech-
nique. After the coal is recovered in longwall mining, the supports 
are removed and the roof is allowed to collapse safely. This tech-
nique is used where the geological formation above the coal seam 
allows controlled and uniform settling. 
The second method, surface mining, is used where coal is found 
up to 150 feet beneath the surface--the major method used in the 
West. In such instances, the overburden (soil and rock) above the 
coal seam is removed so the shovels and scrapers can extract the 
coal. After the coal is mined, reclamation of the land begins. The 
pit is refilled with the overburden material and soil is spread on 
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top so that the land is returned to its approximate original contour 
as requi4ed by the Su4face Mining Act of 1977.(24) 
Underground mining recove4s only 50 to 60 percent of a seam's 
coal, whe4eas up to 90 pe4cent may be recovered through surface min-
ing. In 1977, the average productivity of surface mines was 
slightly less than three times that of underground mines and yet 
surface mines produced about 60 percent of total U.S. output.(42) 
Both Eastern and Western coal have their own distinct advant-
ages. Most Appalachian and midwestern coal is bituminous with a 
high heat content. A ton of bituminous coal contains the energy 
equivalent of about four barrels of U.S . crude oil. Much of the 
western coal is subbituminous and has a lower heat content by 
weight. Each ton contains the energy equivalent of roughly three 
barrels of oil. Therefore, even though there are less minable coal 
reserves east of the Mississippi, their total heat content is 
greater than that of western coal reserves. Western coal, on the 
othe4 hand, is relatively low in sulfur. The sulfur content of coal 
in the U.S. generally ranges from 0. 2 to 7. 0 percent by weight. 
Western coal contains only one percent sulfur average by weight, 
emitting fewer sulfur compounds per ton of coal burned. In addi-
tion, it is less expensive to produce western coal, which is mostly 
extracted through surface mining. However, this is partly offset by 
its lower heat content and the higher cost of transporting western 
coal to the major coal users. 
The largest users of coal are utilities. Currently, more than 
70 percent of all domestic coal is consumed as a boiler fuel for 
16 
electric power generation; however, coal's total share of the util-
ity market is just 44 percent.(11) The one factor, though, that is 
likely to have the greatest impact on the utilities' use of coal is 
the viability of nuclear energy. The accident at the Three Mile 
Island nuclear plant as well as soaring capital costs of construe-
tion are making them economically less favorable. 
trates the widening gap in construction costs. 
Figure 3 illus-
Yet utili ties have made no wholesale move to coal. This is 
primarily due to an overall slowdown of the U.S. economy, with an 
electrical growth demand of two to three percent in the next five to 
ten years. ( 44) Other factors tending to constrain the growth of 
utilities include government air-pollution regulations and licensing 
procedures (which increase costs) and related difficulties in rais-
ing capital for new plants. 
Until 1960, the coal industry consisted primarily of coal-min-
ing companies and a few steel firms and utilities. It was also reg-
ional, isolated, and confined almost entirely to east of the Missis-
sippi. In the late sixties, however, demand from utilities began 
increasing. Petroleum firms became major forces in the coal indus-
try as they began to buy operating coal companies, acquired coal 
reserves, and established totally new coal subsidiaries. By the 
midseventies, other types of large companies joined oil firms in 
starting or increasing production, bringing in a still larger base 
of corporate, managerial, and technical resources. Table 4 presents 
the top private firms in regard to U.S. Coal reserves. 
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FIGURE 3 
POWER PLANT CAPITAL COSTS 
(In 1979 Steam-Plant $/kW, 
With Real Interest During Construction) 
Coal 
Nuclear 
1971 
(projected) 
Source: Charles Komanoff, Science (May 8, 1981) (32) 
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TABLE 4 
U.S. COAL RESERVES, 1981 
(Million of Tons) 
Company1 
Bu~lington No~thern 
Consolidation (Conoco) 
Rocky Mountain (Union Pacific) 
Exxon 
Peabody Coal (Peabody Holding 
Phillips Pet~oleum 
No~th American 
El Paso Natu~al Gas 
Island Creek (Occidental 
Mobil 
Am ax 
Pittsburg & Midway (Gulf) 
U.S. Steel 
Atlantic Richfield 
Sun Oil 
Westmoreland Coal 
Bethlehem Coal 
Old Ben (Std. of Ohio) 
NERCO 
Clinchfield Coal (Pittston) 
Tenneco 
Texaco 
Central Appalachian 
Ker-McGee 
R&F Coal (Shell) 
Can Pac Mine~als 
Norfolk & Western 
Utah Int'l (Gen. Elect~ic) 
Donan Joint Ventu~e 
Texas Utilities 
Eastern Gas 
Hillman Coal & Coke 
Houston Natu~al Gas 
Kaise~ Steel 
Western Ene~gy (Montana Powe~) 
NICOR 
Northern Coal 
Armco 
Tennessee Valley Autho~ity 
Kentucky River 
U. S. Total 
Oil Firm TotalS 
Reserves 
14,7002 
13,700 
10,000 
9,200 
8,560 
8,000 
5,600 
5,200 
3,800 
3,500 
3,3003 
2,600 
2,300 
2,200 
2,200 
1,949 
1,800 
1, 713 
1,700 
1,700 
1,700 
1,650 
1,600 
1,500 
1,460 
1,410 
1,400 
1,300 
1,224 
1,150 
1,058 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
934 
855 
800 
284,1854 
53,223 
1o of Total 
5 . 2 
4.8 
3.5 
3.2 
3.0 
2.8 
2.0 
1.8 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
0.9 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0 . 5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0 . 4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
100.0 
18.7 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
U.S. COAL RESERVES, 1981 
1 Private companies only. The U.S. government owns over 100 
billion tons, the largest single share of total reserves (at 
least 40 percent of the U.S. total). 
2 Approximately 
reserves are 
detet"'Itline if 
their own. 
5.8 billion tons of Burlington Northern's 
leased to coal companies . We are unable to 
other firms report these leased reserves as 
3 20.6~ owned by Standard of Califo~ia. 
4 The figure for U.S. total coal reserves indicates an upward 
revision for coal reserves over previous years' reserves. In 
1981, The U.S. Department of the Energy released a study up-
dating earlier estimates of the demonstrated reserve base of 
coal in the U.S. The Department of Energy estimates this 
base as equal to 4 7 4, 556. 2 million tons--an increase of 36 
billion tons over the January 1, 1976 estimate made by the 
Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of Interior. If standard 
recovery rates of 50 percent is applied for underground coal 
reserves (times 318,199.7 million tons) and 80 percent for 
surface reserves (times 156,356.6 million tons), then an 
estimate is determined of 284,185 million tons for actual 
recoverable coal reserves using today's technology. 
5 Major oil fit"'Itls in this total are: Ashland, Atlantic Rich-
field, Belco, Standard of Califo~ia, Cities Service, Conoco, 
Diamond Shamrock, Exxon, Great Basins, Gulf, Husky, Kerr-
McGee, Louisiana, Land & Exploration, MAPCO, Merchants 
Petroleum, Mid- Continent Resources, Mobil, Occidental, Phil-
lips, Quaker State, Reading & Bates, R. L. Burns, Shell, 
Standard Oil of Ohio, Sun, Tenneco, Texaco, Transcontinental, 
W. R. Grace. Other oil firms hold coal reserves, but each 
would have less than one million tons. Their inclusion would 
have a negligible effect on market shares. 
Source: Keystone News Bulletin, U.S. 
Demonstrated Reserved Base of 
January 1, 1980 (U.S. Total). 
Department of 
Coal in the 
Energy, 
U.S. on 
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Most eastern coal reserves are privately owned; on the other 
hand, 60 percent of western t"eserves are owned by the federal gov-
ernment and an additional 20 percent of privately owned is dependent 
on access across federal lands for its production.(16) 
Labor Situation 
The trend of employment in mines has been generally downward . 
In 1925 a total of about 750,000 men were engaged in coal mining in 
the U.S., but by the early 1960's the number had fallen to about 
160,000.(15) The decrease in employment has been particularly mark-
ed in the anthracite industry. As employment has fallen, the pro-
ductivi ty of the individual miner has increased, largely through 
mechanism. 
The coal industry has a highly skilled and dedicated workforce 
that has increased productivity to the extent that labor costs have 
not grown since 1978. This is due partly to the fact that fewer 
mines are producing and the less efficient mines are among the ones 
that have shut down. Yet productivity also appears to be impt"oving 
due to the growing realization by both labor and management of their 
mutual role in attaining a healthy, stable industry. 
In recent years, labor-management relations within the coal 
industry have been strained because of internal factors, such as 
dissension among leaders of the union and an influx of young, in-
experienced workers. More than half of the miners are under 40. 
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Many have gone to college then back to the mines for the high wages 
of up to $100 a day.(15) 
The UMW presently has 220,000 members.(8) The UMW 1 s share of 
U.S. coal production has dropped from 70'?o to 501.. since the early 
1970 1 s. It has lost ground competitively not only to foreign coal 
in export markets but also to more cheaply-mined western coal. 
The UMW has not been effective at organizing coal miners in 
the Western states. It is thought that the UMW had spent some $10 
million to bring in a grand total of just 542 new members from the 
West - which is only 17"!.. unionized. The UMW members see nonunion 
coal as a major threat to their jobs, one reason UMW joblessness 
stands at 41,000.(15) 
Strikes have hurt UMW 1 s efforts to organize expanding coal 
fields in the Western U.S., which are now producing 561.. of coal out-
put. The industry has been affected with a pattern of contract 
strikes in recent years--44 days in 1974, 111 days in 1978, and 72 
days in 1981.(8) The lesson many industries learned from the UMW 1 s 
decision to strike is that coal from the Eastern U.S. still cannot 
be counted on as a reliable source of energy. 
A stronger union with an ability to keep its members disci-
plined, could be good for the traditionally fragmented industry. 
The objective is to restore competitiveness to the industry. In 
order for U.S. coal to compete in domestic and world markets 1 the 
cost of labor must relate directly and proportionately to productiv-
ity. On the other hand, more effective organizing will enable the 
UMW to increase its bargaining leverage. 
CHAPTER III 
TRANSFORATION: AN UNNECESSARY CONFLICT? 
We are not so displeased as surprised. When 
you think that the U.S. put a man on the moon, 
you'd think that it would have modern railroad and 
pier facilities . But the technology is 30 to 50 
years out of date. 
Eric Thibau, Conunercial Attache' of the 
French Embassy in Washington(7) 
With the apparent inevitability of a greater dependence on 
coal for energy in the United States, a huge development effort will 
be required--new mines, more miners, and an expanded system for 
transporting coal to the plants where it will be burned or converted 
into liquid or gaseous forms. Table 5 shows the projected 
transportation requirements by the year 2000. 
TABLE 5 
COAL TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS, 1976-2000 
Percentage by Mode 
Convention Train 
Unit Train 
Coal Barge 
Coal Truck 
Slurry Pipeline 
Total Coal 
Percentage 
1976 
34% 
23'Yo 
29% 
14'Yo 
_o_ 
100'Yo 
by Mode Average 
2000 1976 
14% 490 MI. 
50% 580 
171o 650 
9'Yo 50 
lO'Yo 
_Q 
100'1., 480 
Haul 
2000 
520 MI. 
990 
440 
50 
980 
940 
Source: Mr. J. 
Petroleum Supply 
Petroleum Company. 
R. Stephens, Project 
Division of Petroleum 
Development Coordinator, 
Products Group, Phillips 
22 
23 
Most of the coal is now carried by railroads, and they have 
taken the position that they will be able to keep up with any 
increase in the traffic. The increasing dependence on the railroad 
will be especially great in the West because its low sulfur coal can 
be surface-mined as well as because of the expected growth in the 
use by Western utilities. This makes the railroad the key means of 
transportation since it is already in place, although not 
necessarily with sufficient capacity, where there are no navigable 
waterways. 
Truck transportation is mostly used from mine mouth to 
processing for shipment. Trucks do make distritution to small, 
short-distance customers; however, this service should decline 
toward the year 2000 as distances increase and customers get larger. 
Uncertain is the ability of the railroads to carry the 
expected growth of coal traffic in the West. The principal rail 
carriers of Western coal are the Burlington Northern, Chicago and 
Northwestern, Union Pacific, and the Denver and Rio Grande. To 
service the large surface mines of the West, these railroads are 
increasingly using unit trains, which consist of a chain of about a 
hundred hopper cars with · each carrying a hundred tons of coal. 
Fifty percent of the coal carried by rail now moves on unit trains, 
and a potential problem is the availability of sufficient coal cars 
and locomotives to meet the demand. For example, in 1976 the 
Burlington Northern used about fifty-five such trains per week; by 
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1985 it wi 11 require as many as two hundred. ( 2 7) The hundred-car 
trains are expensive as well as the maintenance needed to keep the 
tracks in running condition. Norman M. Lor:entzsen, president of the 
Burlington Northern, has stated that fuel costs have risen by 301 
percent since 1967 and wages have increased by 174 per:cent.(38) 
The new demand on railroads to carry coal places enormous 
stress on their: capital expenditure requirements for: hopper: cars, 
physical plant improvements, and maintenance locomotives, 
facilities. However:, both government and industry groups believe 
that, if demand for: coal expands at the projected rate, the capital 
will become available for upgrading the railroads and other: parts of 
the transportation system. In the May 1980 report of the WOCOL, 
government and industry participants concluded that "the amount of 
capital required to expand production, transport and user facilities 
to triple the use of coal (by the year 2000) is within the capacity 
of domestic and international capital markets."(l) 
Railroads also face other: problems. First, Western railroads 
create their own set of environmental and social hazards. Frequent 
unit trains can rumble through towns, disrupting whole communities. 
Auto traffic is delayed and various studies project an increased 
number of train-related accidents. The cost of bypassing these 
communities altogether: presents a significant and still largely 
unknown factor in the economics of coal rail transportation. 
Second, there is some chance that the railroads might not 
carry all the increased output of the West, for they face potential 
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competition from slurry pipelines. In a slurry pipeline system, 
coal is pulverized to the consistency of sugar and then mixed with 
an equal amount of water to form a slush-like mass that can be 
pumped through an underground pipeline three or four feet in 
diameter. When it reaches its destination, the slurry is put 
through a dewatering plant where the coal powder and water are 
separated by a centrifuge. The powder can then be burned as fuel by 
a power station, while the water can be used in the utility's 
cooling system. To avoid pollution, the waste water can then be 
allowed to evaporate.(30) 
In many ways, slurry systems have major advantages over rail 
transport of coal. Not only are they nonpolluting and 
inconspicuous, once installed they are also highly reliable. The 
Black Mesa pipeline, a 273-mile pipeline which runs from Kayenta, 
Arizona to the Mohave Generating Station in southern Nevada, has 
been out of action for less than one percent of its time in 
service.(l9) 
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has reported 
that the potential advantage of slurry pipelines lies in the fact 
that the volume of coal that can pass through the pipeline can be 
increased considerably without a corresponding rise in operating 
costs. (52) Pipeline operating costs are relatively stable while 
railroad costs are not. The reason is that the railroads are 
burdened with high labor costs partly due to union work rates. 
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Bechtel, Helman, and Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Company, partners 
in a coal slurry venture called Energy Transpot"ation Systems, Inc. 
(ETSI) pi"ojected in one study that slut"I"Y rates would not rise over' 
one percent a year versus nearly five percent for the r:ailroads.(l8) 
Construction of a pipeline invariably requit"es the crossing of 
routes on lands conti"olled by other transport systems--principally 
the railroads. The railt"oads have fought legislation at both the 
fedei"al and state level that would give slurry pipelines the right 
to eminent domain act"oss land owned by the I"aili"oads. Pipeline 
sponsors, though, through successful court suits and state 
legislation ai"e gradually obtaining eminent domain power'. The 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, asked by sevet"al 
committee chairmen to look into the matter of eminent domain, 
concluded that "coal slui"ry pipelines do represent under some 
specific circumstances the least costly available means foi" 
transporting coal" and without a I"ight of eminent domain pipelines 
would have difficulty competing with railr:oads.(32) 
The railroads, which depend on coal-hauling foi" 11 percent of 
their: revenues and even moi"e of their pi"ofits, readily concede that 
slurry lines will be attt"active enough to steal much of their' coal 
business, possibly driving several railroads to bankruptcy. Louis 
Menk, chairman of Burlington Northern, has said that competition 
fi"orn the proposed ETSI pipeline alone could cut the I"ailroad's 
revenues by $150 million a year'. Burlington Northei"!l has already 
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spent nearly 600 million on the transformation into the nation • s 
leading hauler of Western coal (BN hauls approximately two-thirds of 
all Western coal) and has yet to have any of it returned. Complete 
plans included BN having to invest $1.2 billion in new track, 
centralized traffic control, and locomotives by the end of 
1983--including upgrading 800 miles of track between Billings, 
Montana and Lincoln, Nebraska and laying 116 miles of new railroad 
at a cost of $1 million per mile.(31) 
The decision to build slurry pipelines is not likely to be 
decided solely on the basis of cost. The Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment pointed out in a report that a decision 
depends on the weights that are assigned to other issues. The 
report identifies three major groups of issues. 
The first group concerns the desirability 
from social, economic, and environmental 
standpoints of developing an industry for 
carrying coal by pipeline. The second concerns 
the extent to which the present regulatory and 
institutional arrangements would have to be 
changed to provide forthe allocation of coal 
traffic between pipelines and railroads in a way 
that would represent the least cost to society. 
The third concerns the balance between state and 
federal control over such matters as the 
allocation of water resources, the ownership of 
land and the protection of the environment.(32) 
Pipeline developers must contend with environmentalists who 
object to slurries because of the vast amounts of water that would 
drain away from areas that are already water-short. A 1,100 mile 
slurry pipeline proposed by Houston Natural Gas Corporation would 
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use enough water to supply 40,000 people per year. Company 
officials counter by saying that no drinkable water will be used. 
Their intention is to drill for brackish or saline water unfit for 
human consumption or agriculture.(19) 
The proposed ETSI pipeline alone would require 4. 9 billion 
gallons a year, (30) which is a highly emotional issue with many 
ranchers. However, the State of Wyoming has given ETSI permission 
to take what it needs from subterranean pools in the Madison 
formation, a geological basin alongside the Big Horn Mountains whose 
water is too salty for home use or farming (See Figure 4). 
Hydrologists fear, though, that pumping the five billion gallons 
yearly from the formation in Wyoming could adversely affect ground 
water supplies in that state and South Dakota. Many agree that a 
slurry pipeline would put far less pressure on the water supplies 
than most other methods of using the coal. Evaporation loss, alone, 
is ten times the amount ETSI will utilize annually; but if the first 
pipeline proved profitable, others would surely fo l low and a rash of 
lines could than deplete the water supplies. 
Other factors, such as environmental regulation, court 
litigation, and environmental impact statements, have also slowed 
down the rush to mine Western coal. At a meeting in July 1979 of 
the Western Governors Conference, the ten Western states represented 
served notice that they want a "cautious approach" to coal 
development. They want compensation for environmental damage and a 
Figure 4 
ETSI COAL SLURRY PIPELINE 
Overall Length: 
Diameter: 
Water Line: 
Pump Stations: 
1400 miles 
40 inches 
270 miles 
19 (every 80-100 miles) 
Source: Oilstream Economic Report, vol. 10, February) 1983. 
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national conservation effort at least as aggressive as the current 
drive for synthetic fuels.(36) 
Inland and coastal waterways. Waterways, where they exist, 
provide the most efficient and least expensive means of moving 
coal. However, there are no waterways serving many areas where coal 
needs to be moved. 
Barging, for the most part, is used to move coal from 
producing mines near the rivers . to· power companies, industrial 
consumers, and steel plants. Over a million tons of coal per year 
move by barge down the Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi Rivers. It 
has been projected that barge traffic on these rivers is neacing 
practical limits, with locks being the prime bottleneck for 
increases in coal shipments. Elimination of bottlenecks are now 
becoming more difficult because of environmentalists and other 
pressure groups. 
The probable limit to expansion of coal traffic in the inland 
waterways is lock capacity . Major traffic jams have already been 
occurring at strategic spots such as the southern Illinois area 
where the Mississippi, Missouri, Illinois, Ohio, Cumberland, and 
Tennessee river traffic flows converge. 
causing these delays. 
Inadequate lock sizes are 
In addition to barge facilities, port facilities are also 
i nsufficient. While experts predict that America's vast coal 
reserves could become an important export product, the use of coal 
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is being hampered by the U.S.'s inadequate and outdated 
transportation system. The export demand for coal in Europe 
increased by nearly 100% from 1981 to 1982, yet buyers were unhappy 
about the delays in deli very . ( 7) The sudden surge in demand put a 
strain on existing pier facilities, leading to port congestion and 
excessive waiting time. U.S. piers have little storage capacity, so 
that railroad cars stocked with coal wait weeks to be unloaded. 
The vast majority of coal moving out of the U.S. goes over a 
group of ports located between the mouth of Chesapeake Bay and New 
York. These are served by eastern railroads (Conrail, Chessie, and 
N & W) that gather coal from producing areas in the Appalachians. 
This group of ports handled a little over three-fourths of all U.S. 
exports, with more than half of the U.S. total moving through the 
Hampton Roads area--which includes the Virginia ports of Newport 
News and Norfolk. 
Aside from these ports about 20 million tons go to Canada by 
rail and through the Great Lakes ports . Minor volumes are shipped 
through Mobile, New Orleans, Long Beach, Portland, and others. 
Listed in table 6 are some of the important U.S. coal ports. 
It was impossible to foresee the market shift which created 
the transportation logjams that hamper the growing export market. 
However, this is a short-term situation resulting from the sudden 
increase in demand, and it will be alleviated over the coul:"se of the 
next several years as the cuL"rent plans to put new port facilities 
in place are completed and as export demand slackens. New coal 
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TABLE 6 
COAL EXPORT PIERS 
Max. Serving 1980 Rated 
Port Coal Piers Draft ShiE . Railroad Volume S2E..:.. 
Newport News No. 14 & No. 15 45' 80 MDWT c & 0 18.3 21.8 
Baltimore Curtis Bay 40' 70 M B & 0 11.0 15.0 
Baltimore Canton 31' Conrail 1.0 
Norfolk No. 5 & No. 6 48' N & W 31.9 33.0 
Philadelphia Greenwich 40' Conrail 1.4 2.5 
Ph iladelphia Pt. Richmond 35' Conrail 0 . 2 
Mobile McDuffle 40' ICG 4.6 5.5 
New Orleans Plaquemines 
Davant Electrocoal 7.0 
ports have been considered at Savannah, GA, Morehead City, NC, and 
Charleston, SC. Port official s in New York City, Houston and 
Galveston, Texas, and Wilmington, Delaware have also considered the 
addition of coal-handling equipment. 
Ocean freight rates are dependent on vessel siz e as with other 
commodities. Because of shallow drafts, U.S. ports are restricted 
to smaller vessels which increase freight costs. The largest 
collier- calling at a Hampton Roads port in 1980 wa s 84,000 dea d 
weight ton (DWT) and most vessels are in the Panamax class. Nearly 
all shipments to the Far East are in Panamax class vessels as the 
longer- voyage around Cape Horn offsets the savings in a larger-
vessel. Average rates in 1982 for vessels used are r-eflected in 
table 7. 
Railr-oad and port officials are working together to 
upgr:-aderail and por-t facilities . Island Creek Coal Company of 
Kentucky and Consolidation Coal, a Pittsburg fir-m, are investing 170 
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TABLE 7 
SINGLE-TRIP OCEAN FREIGHT RATES PER LONG TON OF COAL 
(35,000- 60,000 D.W.T.) 
Source: American Tanker Rates 
U.S. $/Long Ton 
U.S. North to Hatteras to: U.S. 
Gulf to: 
Dunkirk/Hamburg Range 
North Spain, Atlantic Coast 
Spanish Med. 
Port Talbot or Redcar, U.K. 
FOS, France 
Constantza , Romania 
Japan 
Pohang, S. Korea 
Alexandria, Egypt 
Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico 
West Coast Italy 
$14.00/$20.00 
$14.00/$19.00 
$16 . 00/$21. 00 
$14.00/$20.00 
$13.00/$17.00 
$24.00/$29.00 
$2 7 . 00/$30.00 
$27.00/$30.00 
/$25.00 
$14 . 00/$16.00 
$14 . 00/$18.00 
New Castle , Port Kembla or Sydney, Australia to: 
Dunkirk/Hamburg Range 
North Spain 
Wes t Coast Italy 
Port Talbot or Redcar 
U.S . Gulf or U.S. Atlantic 
Japan 
Vancouver, including Roberts Bank, Canada to: 
Dunkirk/Hamburg Range 
Japan 
East Coast Canada (St. Lawrence River) 
$17.00/$22.00 
$17.00/$21.00 
$19 .50/$23.00 
$17 . 00/$22 . 00 
$16.00/$21.00 
$26 .00/$30.00 
$27.00/$30.00 
$27.00/$30.00 
/$27.00 
$14.00/$16.00 
$16.00/$21 . 00 
$23.00/$26.00 
$23.00/$26.00 
$24.00/$28.00 
$25.00/$29 . 00 
$15 . 00/$17.00 
$15.00/$17.00 
$20.00/$23.00 
$13.00/$15.00 
$16.00/$18.00 
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million dollars to improve Bal tirnore' s port. (5) Consolidation also 
bought the Canton Terminal in Baltimore, adding 10 to 20 million 
tons of shipping capacity there.(7) 
Foreign buyet"s at"e tt"ying to skit"t congestion pt"oblems by 
loading at diffet"ent pot"ts. Ft"ance's Association Technique de 
l'Irnpot"tation Chat"bonnait"e, which does all that countt"y's coal 
buying, is considet"ing investing in coal-terminal expansion in New 
0t"leans.(45) 
If rnot"e such steps are taken, pt"edictions at"e that expot"ts of 
steam coal alone could ["each 200 million tons a yeat" by the end of 
the century. An expected increase in U.S. metallurgical coal in 
Japanese and European steel mills would add to that demand. 
CHAPTER IV 
MARKETING : AN AFTERTHOUGHT? 
Since the mid-seventies, the government and others have placed 
much emphasis on coal as an alternative to imported oil. However, 
the results of at tempts to develop coal has been disappointing. 
Whereas domestic oil and natural gas are constrained by geology. 
coal is hemmed in by political issues. The political conf l ict has 
arisen over what the public sees as the side effects of producing 
and using this energy source. 
Today coal provides 18% of U.S. energy, or the equivalent of 
7,000 barrels per day (MB/D). The National Energy Plan introduced 
by the Carter administration called for an increase in coal supply 
between 1976 and 1985 that would provide the equivalent of an added 
7. 9 MB/D of oil. The experience of the past few years, though, 
makes it appear unlikely that the rapid growth indicated in the Plan 
can be achieved. 
An important reason for slower growth is external costs in the 
form of environmental and health problems. In particular, there are 
acid drainage from mines, the disruption of life in western 
communities by unit trains hauling coal, and when it is burned, the 
release of sulfur dioxide and a host of other pollutants. Perhaps 
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most serious of all in the long run may be the unknown consequences 
for future generations of increasing the temperature of the 
atmosphere by producing carbon dioxide. 
Some of these problems can be dealt with, for example, through 
the installation of scrubbers by utilities (to remove sulfur 
dioxide), the building of overpasses over railroad tracks, and the 
return of strip-mined land to its original contour and condition. 
·However, there has been controversy over costs and their allocation, 
and agreement is not yet politically in sight. 
Attention is being given to making coal burn cleaner. Another 
area for continued research is fluidized-bed combustion in which 
coal is burned in a bed of granular particles held in suspension in 
a air stream. Other promising areas are gasification and 
liquefaction. These latter two areas are attractive because a 
structure already exists to transport oil or gas. 
Detailed market opportunity analysis has been conducted by 
government and private industry alike involving coal conversion. As 
these studies evolved, the best market opportunities appear to be 
low to medium BTU* fuel gases produced on site for specific 
*BTU stands for British The~al Unit--the heat required to raise the 
0 0 temperature of one pound of water of 1 F at or near 39.2 F. Gas 
with an energy value exceeding 900 BTU per cubic foot (cf) is 
generally labeled high-BTU gas. Low-BTU gas has a heating value of 
100-200 BTU/cf and medium- BTU gas, 300-650 BTU/cf.(41) 
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industrial/utility customers. The technology exists today, 
commercially proven both in the U.S. and around the world to make 
these conversions. Shortage of captial due to the 1981-82 
recession, uncertainty in competing fuel price forecasts, as well as 
outdated thinking and inertia against change, have held back 
conversions. 
The price of natural gas in selected regions has already 
passed the breakeven point for economic production of low and medium 
Btu gas, primarily in the following areas: 1) in the brick, block, 
glass, and ceramic industry; 2) in selected primary metals, pulp, 
and paper (lime kilns); and 3) in primary industrial minerals (e.g. 
phosphates, soda ash). In addition, due to the incentives for 
cogeneration of electricity in the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978, a great deal of coal use should be anticipated 
in the futur'e, particularly in such industries as chemicals and 
steel. 
As a quick rule of thumb, low BTU gas (LBG) from coal can be 
produced for $2.50/MM BTU plus the cost of delivered coal. If coal 
deliver's at $1.50/MM BTU, then LBG can be pr'oduced for $4.00/MMBtu, 
including capital recovery. Natural gas prices have exceeded 
$4. 00/MMBtu in many places in the U.S. (see Figure 5). 
Contrary to recent press, industry is moving forward with 
synthetic fuels but not necessarily at the levels indicated a few 
years ago. A few big pr'ojects (such as Great Plains, Coolwater, and 
Tennessee Eastman) are being built with Federal backing. 1) Under 
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the Great Plains project, the primary product involves methane which 
will be sold to pipeline gas transportation companies. 2) The Cool 
Water Project involves electricity which will be sold to an 
electrical utility company; and 3) the Tennessee Eastman project, 
whereby the primary product is a synthesis gas, which will be 
converted into chemicals. Yet the synfuels industry for the 1980's 
is going to be more dispersed, involving customer-specific needs in 
geographic areas of high cost natural gas oil. Major projects in 
energy parks or involving the creation of synfuel products for 
liquid fuels is more distant--beyond 1990. 
Of all coal-based liquid synfuels, the most promising appears 
to be methanol. Ford Motor Company, Du Pont (which purchased 
Conoco, Inc. in 1981), and a few others are taking the lead in this 
area . Fleet uses such as BankAmerica in California will occur first 
to be followed by mass marketing. Although Du Pont has currently 
delayed its plans for marketing methanol, the early planning stages 
visualized that the automotive market would be used in a limited 
area--one state or a group of adjacent states--so that they could 
provide the requisite service station outlets without going to 
national distribution immediately. As the demand expanded, 
additional service station outlets would be provided. This strategy 
is similar to the development of the diesel fuel and unleaded 
gasoline markets, although other factors provided the driving force 
for marketing these products. 
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With the prices of more traditional fuels falling, the future 
of synfuels is once again being questioned. However-, one should 
only look back a few years when oil was $3.00 per barrel and gas was 
$0.20/MCF. Today, oil hovers at $30.00/bbl and gas exceeds 
$4.00/MCF to $5.00/MCF in several areas of the country. Given the 
volatile international political environment, a major disruption in 
oil supply could still easily happen. Natural gas deregulation 
effects are quite complex, but generally, prices are projected to 
rise faster than inflation (two to three percent). A 1984 Data 
Resources, Inc. industrial sector natural gas price forecast for the 
Mountain I region, which includes the massive overthrust production 
area, projects a 1990 price of $4. 71/MCF and a year- 2000 price of 
$6.69/MCF (in constant 1983 dollars). In current dollars, assuming 
about six percent per year inflation, these equate to $7.19/MCF and 
$18.46/MCF respectively (see figures 6 and 7.) 
Steam Coal Market 
The primary steam coal demand will be for high BTU bituminous 
coal with a low sulfur content generally below 1. 5 percent. 
coal deposits that are favorably located on good 
transportation systems will have the competitive edge. 
Also, 
inland 
From the viewpoint of the customer, he is purchasing BTU's on 
a net-delivered cost basis. High quality coals with good heating 
value will be at a disproportionate competitive advantage against 
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the lessel:" value coals. This is because transporation costs are a 
good portion of the entire delivel:"ed costs. With lower value coals, 
more tonnage must be shipped fot" a given BTU output, and this 
increases the overall costs more than is l:"eadily apparent. Fol:" 
example, considel:" a low sulfut" 13,000 BTU West Virginia coal selling 
fot" $37.00 pet" ton at mine mouth. With inland ft"eight of about 
$18.00 pet" ton, this coal.;.could be landed at Hambul:"g fot" $61.00 pet" 
ton Ol:" $2.35 pet" million BTU's. Fol:"'a hypo~hetical coal having the 
same transpol:"tation cost pictul:"e . but with a heat content of only 
11,000 BTU per pound, 18 percent more coal will be needed for the 
same heat output and freight must be paid on the added volume. To 
be competitive with the higher quality coal, the lower grade must be 
priced at $27.70 per ton at the mine mouth; a price reduction of 
over 36 percent results from a difference of 18 percent in BTU 
content. 
If the low value coal were also not favorably located fot" 
relatively cheap transportation, the disadvantage would be even mol:"e 
keenly felt. With the mine producing the 11,000 BTU coal located at 
Chelsea, Oklahoma, combined inland and ocean transpol:"tation through 
Mobile would amount to $33.00 pel:" ton. To be competitive with the 
West Virginia coal, it would have to be pl:"iced at less than $19.00 
per ton. Even worse, the freight on enough 8400-BTU Gillette, 
Wyoming coal, to give the same heating value as West Virginia coal, 
would amount to ovel:" $70. 00--which clearly would make this coal 
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uncompeti tive with present conditions. Of course, these low value 
coals could compete very well in domestic markets where freight is 
not such a factor. 
Sulfur is another matter for increasing concer:-n among overseas 
customet"s. Europeans, in particular, are becoming more and more 
concer:-ned about sulfur emissions as they pose health hazards as well 
as cause damage to their many beautiful and historic marble statues 
and buildings . Most European countries already have emission codes 
and these are likely to be tightened in the future. Low sulfur coal 
will be more in demand than the grades with more sulfur. 
In the near term, though, the region most favorably situated 
to participate in the export market is the Souther:-n Appalachian 
basin including parts of West Virginia, Kentucky, and Virginia. 
This is the only area at present with an adequate transportation 
system, good ports, and competitive quality coal. Over the long 
term, as transportation and ports are improved, Western coal from 
certain areas will likely become a major factor, particularly as 
heavy demands deplete some of the better Appalachian reserves. 
Figure 8 exemplifies one of the determining factors of transporta-
tion costs. 
How is Coal Marketed? 
Coal is priced and sold domestically and in international 
trade, primarily on long-term contracts that call for delivery of 
FIGURE 8 
BTU's OF ENERGY REQUIRED TO MOVE ONE TON OF FREIGHT ONE MILE 
J f Oil Pipeline - 500 
Bar-ge - 990 
Coal Slurry Pipeline - 1,270 
Railr-oad- 1,720 
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 
Sour-ce: Congr-essional Budget Office 1982 
Truck - 3,420 
3,000 3,500 
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specified volumes of coal with certain chemical and physical 
characteristics over the contract life. Coal not bought on 
long-term contract is sold on the spot market where prices are free 
to fluctuate according to forces of supply and demand at that point 
in time. 
Most coal in the United States is sold under a long-tern~ 
contract of 20 to 30 years. Utilities are anxious to secure 
long-term contracts since utility plants are engineered to utilize 
coal with very specific characteristics. Using a different type of 
coal usually results in lower levels of efficiency. About 80 
percent of utility coal purchases are made under long-term 
contract.(28) This coal is generally priced at a basic price with 
an escalator to account 
costs. Customers for 
for higher production and transportation 
metallurgical coal also try to secure 
long-term supply arrangements to satisfy their needs of high quality 
met coal. 
Most large coal companies maintain their own sales staffs that 
handle all coal sales between their company and its customers. Some 
companies will additionally act as brokers for other companies. 
Smaller coal companies commonly rely on independent coal brokers who 
charge sellers a fee for their services. 
Historically, international coal trade has involved mostly 
metallurgical grade coals for cokemaking. However, as energy 
requirements expand in energy-deficient nations, these nations are 
corning to rely increasingly on imports of steam coal from the major 
coal-producing nations. 
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Coal p~ices natu~ally fluctuate with supply and demand facto~s 
f~om time to time. They also depend strongly on coal quality, 
location, and othe~ conditions. To give a representative picture of 
steam coal pricing, the table 8 illustrates approximate spot market 
prices during the first few months of 1981. 
Currently the demand for coal hinges predominantly on the 
generation of electricity, and expectations are that this demand 
will remain flat through the 1980's. E~ectricity sold .to industry 
is the crucial factor in electrical generation and . the amount of 
coal-fired capacity the utility industry uses. 
Emphasizing the importance of the industrial sector's 
electricity is the two percent national decline in total electricity 
use during the 1981-1982 recession. The decline of the industrial 
component of electricity consumption was worse, dropping by eight 
percent as steel, auto plant, and other factories shut down. 
However, the residential and commercial components were actually 
increasing their electricity use by about two percent, (28) meaning 
the overall decline was due solely to the shrinkage in industrial 
use. 
What will greatly help is legislation such as that which was 
approved recently by the New York State Senate, aimed at encouraging 
utilities to construct alternative energy · generation facilities ore 
onvert oil-fired plants to burn coal. The legislation would permit 
utilities to include in their rate base the costs of converting oil-
fired plants to coal, wind or solar. The utilities could then 
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TABLE 8 
INTERNATIONAL SPOT STEAM COAL PRICES 
Country/Port BTU/LB .,.., Sulfur 1o Ash Price* 
u.s. Norfolk 11,500 Below 1.5 15.0 $47.73 
11,500 1.5 16.0 $40.00-44.09 
Baltimore 12,000 Below 1.5 13.5 $44 . 55 
Mobile 11,300 1.3 15.5 $41.36 
Poland Gdansk 11,300 1.0 13.5 $40.90-49.32 
S. Africa Richards Bay 12,500 1.0 13.0 $39.77 
1i '90.0 1.0 15.0 $38.41 
Australia Newcastle 12,000 Below 1.0 13.0 $41.36-51 . 36 
11,500 1.0 15 .5· $38.18-48.18 
Europe ARA** 11,200 1.5 15.0 $63.18 
11,000 1.5 15.0 $52.27-61 . 36 
11,300 Below 1.0 1.5 $62 . 73 
11,500 1.0 15.0 $65.00 
12,200 Below 1.0 12.5 $67.73 
12,000 1.5 15.0 $65.45 
12,500 Below 2.0 13 . 2 $68 . 64 
Spain 11,200 1.5 17 . 0 $63.64 
11,700 1.0 13.0 $65.45 
U.K . 11,500 1. 75 14.0 $60.90 
Germany 12,000 1.35 12.5 $69.55 
11,500 1.1 13.5 $66.82 
12,200 1.2 13.5 $71. 82 
Taiwa n 12,000 1.8 16.5 $57.73 
*Prices in U.S . Dollars per short ton. Add or subtra c t 27.3¢ per 
ton for each 100 BTU above or below stated specs. Add or subtract 
27.3¢ for each 0.1% sulfur deviation from specs. 
**Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp 
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could then avoid paying interest on construction loan financing. 
The crux of this bill is to deliver alternative sources to oil-fired 
generation to consumers at the lowest and fastest possible cost . (53) 
The potential applications of coal gasification and 
liquifaction processes extend far beyond utilities. The force 
behind the interest in cogeneration is that it shows significant 
improvement over conventional generation in fuel efficiency. In 
conventional electrical generation, fuel is burned in a boiler to 
produce steam, which is fed to a steam turbine to drive a dynamo. 
Typically only 35 percent--and sometimes as little as 28 percent -
of fuel is converted into electricity. However, an industrial steam 
user, since it using the steam directly for heat, converts more than 
80 percent of fuel's energy value into useful steam. 
A cogeneration plant supplies electricity and steam with an 
overall fuel efficiency of 70 to 80 percent. In topping-cycle 
cogeneration, by far the most prevalent type, the fuel is used to 
generate steam or burned and the steam or hot gas is expanded 
through a turbine. The cycle operates much like the one in an 
electric-generating station, except that the heat-laden exhaust is 
put to work in process use. 
The economic benefit of using a combined cycle in a 
cogenerating plant lies basically in its ability to produce more 
power than an ordinary steam or gas turbine cogeneration plant. 
Whereby a conventional steam turbine cogeneration plant can produce 
72 kw/million BTU and a gas turbine plant can produce 200 kw/million 
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BTU, the combined-cycle plant can turn out 265 kw/million BTU. In 
addition. cogeneration becomes even more attractive as fuel costs 
rise. (11) 
industry. 
Table 9 summarizes the relationship of cogeneration to 
Mer-chant Ships 
Because of r-ising oil pr:-ices, coal appear-s r:-eady for a r:-etur:-n 
to t h e merchant ship business. Wor:-ld shipping pr-esently consumes 
near:-ly four:- billion bar:-rels of oil a year:-, about seven per:-cent of 
total wor:-ld oil demand. (6) With oil at $200 a ton and coal only 
$50, the annual fuel bill of a ship that uses 30,000 tons of oil a 
year-equivalent to 48,000 tons of coal-would be $6 million for:- oil 
but only $2.4 million for:- coal. 
Only a few of today's mer-chant ships. now almost wholly 
diesel-power-ed, are scheduled for:- r-eplacement by 1999. If world 
tr:-ade is to become less dependent on the whims of oil supplier-s, the 
pr-opulsion system of today' s ships will have to be conver-ted fr:-om 
diesel to coal-fired steam engines. Conver-sion to coal is pr-actical 
for:- container:- ships of all sizes because much of their:- cargo is 
car:-r:-ied above deck. However:-, conver-sion is not likely to be 
economical for:- bulk car:-r:-iers of less than 70,000 tons because the 
coal-handling and stor:-age facilities would take up too much car:-go 
space. The cost of equipping a 20,000 ton container ship with a new 
boiler:-, stoker-s, bunker-s, and appr:-opr:-iate coal-handling equipment 
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TABLE 9 
HOW INDUSTRY RELIES ON COGENERATION 
Plants Cogeneration Share of 
With Capacity Cogeneration 
Industry Cogeneration (Mega Watts) Capacity 
Chemicals and Allied 
Products 62 3,438 23.1% 
· Pulp and Paper 136 4,246 28.6 
Petroleum and Coal 
Products 24 1,244 8.4 
Rubber and Misc. 
Plastic Products 3 76 0.5 
Stone, Clay, and Grass 6 115 0.8 
Primary Metals 39 3,589 24.2 
All Other 101 2,150 14.4 
TOTAL 371 14,858 100.0 
1982 Data Source: U.S. Dept. of Energy 
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would be about $10 million, which owners would recoup through 
reduced fuel costs in less than four years.(6) 
Home heating . Another market segment is homeowners who are 
turning to coal for home heating. More than 100,000 coal stoves are 
being sold annually, and sales of the fuel in quantities small as 25 
pounds were brisk enough to cause shortages in many parts of the 
East during the winter of 1980.(45) 
Export Business. Many predictions are that exports of steam 
coal alone could reach 200 million tons a year by the end of the 
century. 
potential 
However, there is uncertainty of the future export 
because of reduced world demand due to energy 
conservation; recession in the markets which Pacific Rim countries 
try to fill-autos, televisions, and other finished products; the 
history of long strikes by union miners, and an insufficient 
transportation system. 
The UMW is hoping to regain unity and stability under the 
leadership of Richard Trurnka. However, its inability to join forces 
with Western coal miners thus far suggests that it will be a while 
longer before the mine workers receive the political clout they need. 
The transportation system, as it exists today, is simply 
insufficient and, therefore, more costly to the shipper. 
Transportation costs will continue to plague the industry, 
especially the Western coal industry, and pr;oducers will have to 
work harder to increase sales in the future. 
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Producer:-s must look fir:-st to utilities that ar:-e using only 
small per:-centages of their coal-fir:-ed capacity. These will be the 
fir:-st to r:-e-enter:- the coal mar:-ket when electr:-icity demand impr:-oves. 
The pr:-oducer:-s must also aggr:-essively scout utilities with new power:-
plants planned or:- conver:-sions anticipated. The mar:-keting effor:-t 
should also be dir:-ected towar:-d the lar:-ge industr:-ial user:-. These may 
be the only industr:-ial user:-s which would be able to r:-ealize r:-ecovecy 
costs for:- conver:-sion over:- a r:-easonable per:-iod of time, pr:-oviding 
attr:-active tax incentives ar:-e available. 
The conclusion dr:-awn fr:-om the sur:-vey of 30 coal companies 
(Exhibit I) is that effor:-t has been placed on technology--technology 
without a mar:-ket plan. Companies such as the Black Hills Power:- and 
Light Company (Rapid City, SD), Solvent Refined Coal Inter:-national, 
Inc. (Denver:-, CO), and E.I. Dupont (Wilmington, DE) ar:-e thr:-ee 
examples of those companies whose pr:-ojects nave been delayed indef-
initely. Mr:-. Phil L. Isr:-ael, Senior:- Vice Pr:-esident of Oper:-ations 
for:- Tr:-anscontinental Oil Cor:-por:-ation (headquar:-tered in Shr:-evepor:-t, 
LA) stated that "these pr:-ojects ar:-e much too costly for:- companies of 
less then $1 billion in assets without gover:-nment suppor:-t." 
The advantage of having a mix of fuels is not having all of 
the eggs in one basket. This offer:-s some pr:-otections against any 
fear:-s of monopoly pr:-icing, str:-ikes, embar:-goes, and weather:- effects. 
If the envir:-onment is really protected, ther:-e is no strong objection 
to synthetic fuels by envir:-onmentalists. 
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The market potential exists. To do anything but fight for 
mal:"ket share would be a serious mistake made by producers. Mr. 
W. B. Watson, Feedstocks Planning Manager for E. I. Dupont, wrote 
(in response to the questionnaire) that "our plans for marketing 
synthetic fuels have not progressed to that point" and could, 
therefore, not be specific. It is feared that this is the position 
of the majority of coal producers--that marketing is indeed an 
afterthought. Unless the coal industry plans to ,·fight, it will 
continue to hover uncertainty. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Despite its abundance, the shift to coal as a dominant 
al ten1ati ve resoui"ce has been slow. Coal has been hemmed in by 
political issues ai"ising over what the public views as the side 
effects of producing as well as using this product. Also, before 
coal can even be considered economically atti"active, I"educing 
transportation costs is a necessity. 
High transpor'tation costs result from an inefficient system 
which, in tun1, I"esults from the lack of political support necessary 
to make the changes. The industry will not I"ecei ve this suppor't 
until the coal producers effectively develop their' market. 
The market, as d~veloped in this I"eport, includes utilities, 
industi"ial users, merchant ships, home heating , and export. The 
various requirements which should be considei"ed in the development 
of proper strategies are shown in table 10. 
During the I"esearch process, it was detei"rnined that the coal 
industry, as a whole, had a set of unique problems which must be 
addressed before individual market strategies could be analyzed. 
These problems ai"e categorized as environmental, human, and 
systematic: (1) the emission of air pollutants and the wai"rning of 
the earth's temperature, (2) the increase of fatalities and injui"ies 
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TABLE 10 
MARKET REQUIREMENTS 
Markets Low Sulphur BTU'S Price Transportation 
Utilities 
Industrial Users 
Merchant Ships 
Home Heating 
Export 
1 1 
1 1 
4 1 
3 2 
1 2 
1 Very important 
2 Important 
3 Somewhat important 
4 Possibly important 
5 Not important 
1 2 
1 2 
2 1 
1 5 
2 1 
among coal workers, and (3) the problems associated with the 
geographic distribution of coal--mainly its transportation. Many of 
the problems can be solved with new technology and proper 
legislation. However, future legislative activity needs to ensure 
the furtherance of improving_ negative environmental impacts; 
promotion of coal to reduce the use of other fuels; and oversight to 
ensure that existing legislation is being appropriately 
implemented. The volatility of the oil industry will also help in 
keeping the future of coal a mixture of promise and risk. 
The United States has the coal. The market potential exists. How-
ever, its abundance does not automatically assure a growth in coal 
consumption. An aggressive yet calm and reasonable approach in the 
short term, and an overall long-term focus that would include a pro-
gram to burn coal indirect combustion as a liquid or gas, will per-
mit more freedom in meeting energy needs. Until this is done, coal 
will not become the dominant energy source desired. 
Peabody Coal Co. 
301 N. Memo~ial Drive 
St. Louis, MO 63102 
Dear Si~: 
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EXHIBIT I 
P.O. Box 1371 
Bartlesville, OK 74005 
August 16, 1983 
I am in the p~ocess of completing my M.B.A. ~equirements at 
Oklahoma State University. My thesis on the futu~e of synfuels 
(primarily coal) is in the market analysis stage. I am writing to 
your company to request possible information on this subject. 
With the prices of more traditional fuels falling, the futu~e of 
synthetics is once again being questioned. I am aware, however, 
that in spite of falling fuel prices, some synfuel projects are now 
moving toward commercial operation requiring some formalized market-
ing program. Specifically, I am in need of information concerning 
any market plans you may have that could be shared to add credit-
ability to my report. 
Your assistance in providing any information available for pub-
lication will be greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Phyllis E. Kern 
CHAPTER VI 
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